Abstract-Safety analysis is a fundamental problem in authorization models. Safety decidable models provide theoretical foundations for decentralized security administration. Attributes of objects are central to usage control authorization models. It has previously been shown that inclusion of a single infinite attribute leads to undecidable safety, even without any creation of objects. Therefore unrestricted inclusion of infinite attributes is not possible in a safety decidable model. On the other hand, it has recently been shown that the safety problem for the pre-authorization usage control sub-model with finite attribute domains, called PreUCON finite A
INTRODUCTION
Usage control is an unified authorization system which supports wide variety of security policies besides traditional access control [1] . Safety decidability is one of the fundamental requirements for decentralizing and automating the administration of authorization systems. In particular, it is a basic requirement for development of policy analysis tools for the system administrators, to check if the given set of policies and the initial configuration can give out an unintended access right in any of the future states. Such checking is called safety analysis and is known to be undecidable in general for the pre-authorization usage control model [2] , hereafter called P reU CON A . Therefore, safety checking of P reU CON A cannot be automated in its full generality and its safety decidable sub-models necessarily have restrictions on the attributes and update functions.
Attributes of objects along with authorization predicates constitute the core of P reU CON A . P reU CON A subjects are considered as a subset of objects. Attributes represent the security relevant features of objects in the system. Authorization predicates defined over the attributes represent the authorization security requirements. Usage rights are the security sensitive functions of the system whose executions need to be guarded with authorization predicates. The domain of an object's attribute specifies the set from • which that attribute can take a value. A domain can be finite or infinite, so accordingly we call each attribute as a finite domain or infinite domain. Both finite and infinite domain attributes are useful in expressing authorization policies. In the P reU CON A model, a subject can execute a usage right over an object if the attribute values of the subject, object pair satisfy the corresponding authorization predicates. Execution of usage rights can dynamically create new objects in the system, as well as delete existing objects and modify attribute values. These features of the model can express security policies that are meant to prevent unauthorized creation, deletion, and usage of files, documents, and processes. Unbounded execution of object-creating commands can bring potentially infinite number of objects in the system. Infinite domain attributes are necessary to express certain authorization requirements, in particular, systems with infinite number of objects. However, safety analysis of P reU CON A with arbitrary infinite domain attributes, even without object creation, is undecidable [3] . Therefore, to achieve safety decidability the choice of the infinite domain and the update operations need to be restricted.
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In prior work, it has been shown that safety is decidable for P reU CON A with finite attribute domains [4] without any restrictions on object creation or on update operations. We call this the P reU CON f inite A model. It can express authorization requirements with finite domain attributes such as types, security labels and consumable rights.
A subtle but commonly used security attribute in information systems is object identifiers. Uniqueness of such identifiers play a vital role in expressing certain useful security policies. A common use of object identifiers is to establish relationships amongst objects such as parent and child. Another common example arises in dynamic separation of duties, such as a security policy which states that an employee who created a check must be different from the employee who approves the check. These cases can be easily enforced by utilizing attributes whose values come from the domain of object identifiers. In realistic systems this domain is infinite since, in principle, an unbounded number of objects can be created. In general, identities of files and their creators, identities of database records and tables, and unique document numbers in enterprise resource planning system are examples of important security attributes that require infinite domains.
In this paper, we present a safety decidability proof for a P reU CON A sub-model with infinite identifier domain attributes with constrained update operations, which we call P reU CON id A . In our earlier work on safety decidability for P reU CON f inite A [4] , we used the notion of protection tuples and their equivalence. Protection tuples are the current values in the attributes of the objects in the system. In a given state, the objects with same protection tuples can be grouped as one equivalence class. Due to finite domain attributes, there are only a finite number of equivalence classes. This property was exploited in the decidability proof of P reU CON f inite A . With infinite domain attributes this property no longer holds as the unbounded object creation would lead to potentially infinite number of non-equivalent protection tuples. Therefore, the safety decision procedure developed for P reU CON f inite A [4] may not terminate for certain instances of P reU CON id A . In this work, we develop a safety decision procedure for P reU CON id A with infinite domain attributes that tracks changes in predicates instead of changes in attribute values. Specifically, we define the notion of ω-equivalence with respect to authorization predicates and show that the set of ω-equivalent authorization predicates that can become true is computable, and can be used to answer the safety question.
P reU CON
id A has its own limitations compared to general P reU CON A as it has restrictions on attribute updates, does not support finite domain attributes, and lacks arithmetic operations. A P reU CON A sub-model with both identifier attributes and finite attributes will be more expressive and desirable. Unfortunately, directly combining P reU CON id A with P reU CON f inite A results in undecidable safety as shown in this paper. A challanging open problem arising from this undecidability is to formulate safety decidable P reU CON A sub-models that combine both finite and infinite attribute domains with reasonable restrictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related work. Section 3 reviews the undecidability of safety in P reU CON A with arbitrary infinite domain attributes [3] . Section 4 presents the usage control authorization model with infinite domain identifier attributes newly developed in this paper, viz., P reU CON id A . Section 5 defines the notion of ω-equivalent protection tuples and shows that the set of reachable ω-equivalent protection tuples is computable and can be used to decide the safety problem. Section 6 presents an illustration of expressiveness of P reU CON id A . Section 7 shows that adding a single finite attribute to P reU CON id A results in undecidable safety. It also discusses some open questions regarding safety analysis. Section 8 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
Safety analysis has been actively studied in the context of both access control and usage control authorization models. The Access Matrix Model (ACM) [5] formulates protection systems as a two-dimensional matrix with the rows representing subjects, the columns representing objects and the cells holding a set of rights the subjects have over the objects. The model provides set of commands to change the matrix. Safety of the ACM model had been shown undecidable in general, and decidable if the commands are non-creating or mono-operational. The non-creating model cannot create any new objects in the system. The mono-operational model can create objects but (i) it cannot distinguish between two one newly created objects, and further, (ii) it cannot express any relationship between the creator and the created objects. Recently, safety definitions and proofs presented in the foundation work [5] have been revisited and analyzed in [6] . Set of subjects in ACM is considered as a subset of objects. We also use this convention unless specified otherwise.
The Take-Grant authorization model [7] represents the protection system as a graph with objects as nodes and rights as labeled directed arcs. The model provides graph rewriting rules for execution of take, grant, call, create, and delete rights. The Take-Grant model's safety is decidable, however, its expressiveness is very limited as the rewrite rules are specified as a part of the model itself. Further, if a subject has a right then any subject which is connected to it in the graph can obtain the right without any constraint. The model has no features that can limit rights that can be acquired from one connected subject to another.
The Schematic Protection Model (SPM) [8] , [9] introduced security types where every object in the model has a fixed type. The SPM model has two types of rights: control rights and inert rights. Execution of control rights can change the protection state whereas inert rights cannot. For example, create and delete are control rights while read and write are inert rights. Safety is decidable for the SPM model with acyclic creates. Safety remains decidable for the acyclic SPM with additional features such as (i) inclusion of conditional authorization [10] , (ii) revocation of rights [11] , and (iii) multi-parent object creation [12] .
Typed Access Matrix (TAM) [13] model formulates an access matrix with typed subjects and typed objects. An object's type is decided at the time of its creation, thereafter type cannot be changed. The TAM authorization model with acyclic object creation has decidable safety. Safety decidable TAM combines features in safety decidable fragments of SPM with ACM. Dynamic Typed Access Matrix (DTAM) [14] model provides features for changing object's type after its creation but within a fixed finite domain. Safety of DTAM is decidable if its object creation is acyclic. Safety decidable TAM and DTAM models do not support consumable, regenerative rights, and cyclic creation policies.
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [15] , [16] model associates rights to roles and when a user is assigned to a role he gets the rights that are associated with the role. The RBAC model closely reflects role structured authorization policies within organizations. The RBAC model has been extended to support temporal [17] , [18] and location [19] based security features. Administrative models [20] , [21] of RBAC are specifically designed to systematically authorize the security administrators to change the role-permission, user-role assignments and role hierarchies. Execution of such administrative changes may make the system unsafe.
Large information systems in organizations like banks have thousands of roles [22] and manual administration of systems with such large number of roles is a difficult task. Automated safety analysis of RBAC has been widely studied [23] , [24] , [25] and results from other domains like program analysis [26] , logic [27] , and trust management [28] , [29] have been applied for the RBAC safety problem. A detailed study on security analysis of RBAC is given in [29] . Further, model checking based security analysis tool, called Mohawk, has been developed for automatically finding errors in RBAC policies [30] , [31] . Recently, the safety problem in temporal administrative RBAC has been mapped to the safety problem in Administrative RBAC [32] . Thereby, Mohawk has been shown to be applicable for security analysis of temporal administrative RBAC policies. Safety problem in Administrative RBAC models concern analysis of userrole assignment, role-permission assignment, and role-role assignment of RBAC models. Whereas the usage control authorization model has been designed to support broader applications than RBAC [1] .
The safety problem in the general PreUCON A model has been shown to be undecidable [2] . Safety is shown to be decidable for two sub-models of PreUCON A in [2] . First sub-model has finite attribute value domains without creating commands. Second sub-model supports create commands and its safety is decidable if the usage control commands meet three criteria: (i) the attribute create graph is acyclic, (ii) the attribute update graph has no cycle containing create-parent attribute tuples, and (iii) in creating commands both child and parent objects' attributes are updated. The safety decidable model in [2] cannot express cyclic creation policies and the model supports creation of only a finite number of new objects.
The safety problem in a sub-model of the OnU CON A on-going authorization model without object creation commands, has been shown decidable in [33] . Safety decidable model in [33] cannot support creation of any new subjects in the system. An alternative approach to safety analysis is to map the safety problem into a satisfiability problem in logical theories, whereby the decidability results in a specific logical theory can be used to answer the safety question. Safety problem in a sub-model of the OnU CON A has been mapped to a decidable fragment of many-sorted logic [34] . Safety decidable model in [34] Correct enforcement of this policy requires infinite value domains for at least the student id and the team member id attributes. Suppose we use the finite domain {x, y} for these two id attributes. Then there can be two sets of students in the system: one set with student id = x and another with student id = y. A student who chooses a team member with the same id will be denied approval which is incorrect. This problem will persist for any choice of finite domain values for these two id attributes.
SAFETY OF PreUCON A WITH ARBITRARY INFI-NITE DOMAIN ATTRIBUTES IS UNDECIDABLE
Undecidability of safety in the general PreUCON A model has been previously shown [2] . In this section, we briefly describe a proof of undecidable safety for a sub-model of PreUCON A with an arbitrary infinite domain attribute and without create commands. This result was first proved in [3] . It is included here for completeness.
The proof demonstrates that an arbitrary instance of Post Correspondence Problem (PCP) can be mapped to the safety problem in PreUCON A with an infinite domain attribute. Let the objects in PreUCON A have an arbitrary infinite domain attribute, say str, which is initialized to the empty string. The initial configuration of the model has two objects s and o. For each pair (str 1 , str 2 ) of strings in PCP, we can construct a usage control command that appends the first string str 1 to the subject's str attribute and the second string str 2 to the object's str attribute. An additional usage control command is included to grant an unsafe right r if the values of the subject's str attribute and the object's str attribute are equal and non-empty. The subject s can get the unsafe usage right r if and only if the arbitrary instance of the PCP problem has a solution. Thereby, the undecidability of safety in the PreUCON A sub-model follows from the undecidability of the PCP problem. Additional proof details are given in Appendix A.
An important observation from this undecidability result is that the choice of attribute domain and the type of update functions are important aspects that need to be considered while constructing safety decidable PreUCON A submodels with infinite domains. Whereas the PreUCON f inite A with arbitrary finite domain attributes and unconstrained update functions has decidable safety, even with unbounded object creation [4] .
PreUCON f inite A
cannot express certain important relationships like parent and child between the creater subject and the created object. Such linking relationships play a very significant role in enforcing many commonly used security policies. For example policies like 'a parent process can give a subset of its privileges to its child process then eventually revoke the privileges' cannot be enforced without having the linking relationship between the parent process and the child process. The key element in establishing such relationships is the identifiers of the objects. Further, to establish the relationship between the objects, the update functions in the usage control commands must have the ability to store each others identifiers. The set of object identifiers in the systems with unbounded number of objects must be an infinite set, therefore, the domain of attributes which stores the object indentifiers must be an infinite set as well. In this work, we focus on constructing a safety decidable PreUCON A model which can express such important relationships between unbounded number of objects.
THE PreUCON id A MODEL
One of the challenges in constructing safety decidable models is to identify the right synergy between the predicates and update functions, such that the model is expressive enough for practical applications while maintaining decidability. Usage control authorization policies specify the authorization security requirements to execute usage rights as well as the consequence of executing the rights. In PreUCON A security requirements are specified as predicates and the consequences are specified as update operations. The updates may (i) create a new object, (ii) delete an existing object, and (iii) modify attribute values of the objects. We construct a sub-model of PreUCON A with identifier domain attributes, namely PreUCON . We define the usage control authorization scheme in PreUCON id A below, followed by an example.
Usage Control Authorization Scheme
Definition 4.1. A usage control authorization scheme U ω has three components as follows.
Object Schema
Security relevant attributes of objects in an information system and the domain of the attributes are specified in an object schema. A crucial feature of the PreUCON id A model is to express various linking relationships between an unbounded population of objects, for which purpose we use the set of object identifiers in the system as the value domain of the attributes. The id attribute of each object in the system must have a unique value. Since there could be infinite number of objects, the domains of the id attribute must be an infinite set of unique identifiers. For the sake of convenience, we also use the name a 1 to refer the id attribute whenever we do not have to differentiate it from the rest of the attributes. We use ω in OS ω to denote that all the attributes in the object schema are infinite domains attributes.
Definition 4.3. The domain ID is defined as a countably infinite set of unique identifiers in the system.
The choice of the set of values for identifiers is left specific to the application. In practical applications, the domain of one set of object identifiers may differ from that of another set. For example, in online course-ware applications, the course identifier attributes value domain ID c = {CS100-S2016-01, CS104-F2016-02, ...} is usually different from both the faculty identifier attribute's value domain ID f = {FCS000158, FMAT0045067, ...} and the student identifier attribute's value domain ID s = {BS201500018, MS20160021, ...}. In order to simplify the presentation, the object schema in PreUCON id A uses one generic infinite set ID as the value domain of all identifier attributes. Such a generic set may be taken as union of value domains of all identifier attributes in the application. For the above example, the domain of id may be the union of ID c , ID f and ID s . Further, we also assume that there is a single object schema which uniformly applies to all the objects in the system [2] , [4] .
Attributes of objects are atomic valued and can hold an identifier of an object in the system. Values of an object's attributes are accessed using dot(.) operator, e.g., o.x gives the value of object o's attribute x. An important and limiting restriction in PreUCON id A is that once an object's attribute is assigned a value then it remains unchanged forever.
Usage Rights
Usage rights are the finite set of permissions defined over the objects. Usage control commands grant the rights. PreUCON id A supports creation and deletion of objects beside uninterpreted application-specific usage rights. Execution of create brings a new object into the system. Create also assigns a unique value to the id attribute of newly created object while some of the object's attributes may remain unassigned. Such unassigned attributes are marked with the special symbol ϕ ̸ ∈ ID and may get assigned with a value during execution of subsequent usage control commands.
Usage Control Commands
Usage control commands in U ω enforce the authorization requirements and execute update operations before permitting the execution of usage rights. A subject can execute a usage right over an object if the subject, object pair's attribute values satisfy the authorization predicates in a usage control command. There are three types of usage control commands, viz. non-creating, creating and deleting commands. Deleting commands can be ignored for purpose of safety analysis [4] (see Appendix B).
Authorization Predicates
Authorization predicates are composition of specific set of atomic predicates. The most useful operations in the identifier domain are to check whether a value is assigned to an attribute and if it is assigned then to check whether it is equal to the value of another attribute. We define two types of atomic predicates to do such checking on attributes of objects, namely, α-predicates and β-predicates. In the definitions of α-predicates and β-predicates, the attribute name a i is a symbolic placeholder used to denote an attribute of the object o x including the id attribute. The α-predicates are used to ensure that an attributes is assigned a value at most once. They also help in expressing certain consumable rights such as "a student can change his project advisor at most twice". 
The β-predicates are useful in expressing authorization requirements that compare equality between attribute values.
For the moment let us ignore the possibility of object deletion. If the truth value of an α-predicate for an object becomes false then it will remain false thereafter. Likewise, if the truth value of a β-predicate for a given subject, object pair becomes true then it remains true thereafter. Note that the β 2 and β 3 predicates are not opposites of each other. However, if one is true then the other must be false. It is possible for both to be false for a given subject, object pair. Once one of them becomes true for a given subject, object pair it must remain true thereafter.
Non-Creating Commands
The non-creating commands involve an existing subject, object pair. The structure of a non-creating command U C i is as follows.
Command Name r (s, o)
In this command both s and o are input parameters. P α and P β are respectively, the α-predicate conjunct and the β-predicate conjunct defined over the attributes of the subject s and the object o. P β should have at least two β-predicates s.id ̸ = ϕ and o.id ̸ = ϕ to ensure the existence of both s and o. P α must include the sub-conjuncts (s. 
Creating Commands
The structure of a creating command U C i is as follows. Command Name create (s, o)
In this command s is an input parameter and o is an output parameter. P α and P β are the α-predicate conjunct and the β-predicate conjunct respectively, defined over the attributes of the subject s. P β should have at least one β-predicate s.id ̸ = ϕ to ensure the existence of subject s. P α must include the sub-conjunct (s. The create operation in the preU pdate part brings a new object o into the usage control system. Further, the create operation assigns a unique object identifier value to o.id and assigns ϕ to all other attributes of o. The object's identifier value is from the infinite domain ID and the value is never reused. Each function f a in the preU pdate part returns a specific attribute's value from the attributes of its input s or the value of o.id. The Figure 1 diagrammatically shows the relationship between the objects, usage rights, and usage control commands. Other concepts in the figure such as usage configurations and reachable usage configurations are explained in sections 4.4, and section 5.
Example Usage Control Authorization Scheme
The following toy game example illustrates components of a PreUCON id A authorization scheme. The example scheme permits (i) players to red mark white balls created by others, (ii) players to hit balls red marked by themselves, and (iii) players to add new players and create white balls. The object schema OS ω game has five attributes: (i) id is the default object identifier attribute, (ii) player id for storing a player's identity, (iii) ball id for storing a ball's identity, (iv) creator for storing the creator's identity of a ball, and (v) red for remembering if a ball is marked red and which player marked it. In this scheme, the set of players are the subjects and the set of balls are the objects. The player id attribute is used in writing the security properties of the subjects and the remaining attributes are unused for subjects. Likewise, the ball id , creator and red attributes are used in writing the security properties of the objects and the player id attribute is unused for objects.
The usage rights mark and hit are protected using noncreating commands U C 1 and U C 2 , respectively. The addplayer and addball rights are protected using creating commands U C 3 and U C 4 , respectively. This scheme has the set of α-predicates {o.red = ϕ} and the set of β-predicates {s.player id ̸ = ϕ, o.ball id ̸ = ϕ, o.red . = s.player id } as preconditions. The create command U C 3 assigns a unique player identifier to the attribute o.player id and assigns ϕ to the remaining attributes of the newly created object o, which is a new player. Similarly, the create command U C 4 assigns a unique ball identifier to the attribute o.ball id , records the ball's creaor in the o.creator attribute and assigns ϕ to the remaining attributes of the newly created object o. 
Usage Control Configuration
The initial configuration of the usage control authorization scheme U ω is symbolically denoted as U Ξinit . Likewise U Ξt denotes the usage configuration t. A usage control system begins with a specified initial configuration U Ξinit and thereafter it evolves as the subjects execute usage control commands. The set of all possible configurations of the scheme is denoted as the set U Ξω . This set could be potentially infinite as the scheme supports unbounded executions of creating commands. Appendix C gives an example of unbounded creation in context of example 4.8. An execution of usage control command U C i with an actual subject s and an actual object o is called a command instance, denoted as uc i (s, o). Subject s must exist prior to execution of uc i (s, o). For a non-creating command object o must also exist prior to execution of uc i (s, o), whereas for a creating command o is newly created.
Safety Question
Definition 4.11. Safety question is defined as given a usage control authorization scheme U ω and its initial configuration U Ξinit , can the subject s 1 ∈ U Ξinit obtain the usage right r over the object o 1 ∈ U Ξinit ? A safety question is written as Υ (s1,o1,r) .
A safety decision procedure (SDP) takes as input U ω , U Ξinit and Υ (s1,o1,r) . It returns yes if subject s 1 can acquire usage right r for o 1 and no otherwise. In order to make the technical presentation easier, we use a more general version of the safety question called Υ (r) .
Definition 4.12.
The safety question Υ (r) is defined as given a U ω and a U Ξinit , can any subject obtain the usage right r over any object?
If there is an SDP to answer the safety question Υ (r) we can use the same SDP to answer the Υ (s1,o1,r) as shown in Appendix D. 
SAFETY IN PreUCON
In a usage configuration multiple subject object pairs may satisfy the preconditions of a usage control command and a pair may satisfy preconditions of multiple commands as well. Subjects can execute the commands at their own discretion without any predefined order. Execution of a command can bring a new object into the system as well as update the object's attribute values. The new attribute values may enable additional commands and the execution of additional commands can bring new objects as well as update the attribute values. This cycle may continue without bound and can create potentially infinite number of new configurations. Therefore, tracking the changes in usage configuration may not terminate. Instead, our safety decision procedure tracks the changes in the set of satisfiable predicate subconjuncts of P α1 ∧ P β1 , P α2 ∧ P β2 . . . P αcn ∧ P βcn .
The crux of the safety decidability proof lies in showing that there exists a subset of reachable usage configurations which can satisfy the maximal set of sub-conjuncts that are satisfiable in the set of all reachable configurations. We first define the sub-conjuncts and their maximal set for the given usage control authorization scheme U ω and the initial configuration U Ξinit . The symbols used in developing our proof are summarized in Table 1 . The upper bound may not be realized since some atomic predicates may be duplicated in more than one P i . Values stored in the attributes of the objects in a usage configuration determine the satisfiability of the predicates in P ω in that usage configuration. As the usage configuration changes the satisfiable predicates in P ω may also change. We use the notions in definitions 5. The predicates in non-creating commands are defined on the attributes of both the subject s and the object o whereas the predicates in creating usage control commands are defined only on the attributes of the subject s. In order to simplify the tracking of the changes in satisfiability of predicates of both create and non-create commands, we use o ϕ to denote an empty object with no stored values in its attributes including the identifier attribute. The right column in the Table 2 provides the definitions of satisfiability of atomic predicates p i that are defined over the attribute values of subject (s) in the creating usage control commands. We use the notation (s, o ϕ ) to refer an ordered pair of subject and object in the creating usage control commands, here, o ϕ is the symbolic place holder for the newly created object.
For sake of brevity, we use the following definition to check if an atomic predicate p i is satisfiable by the values stored in the attributes of (s, o) for both non-creating and creating commands. 
Definition 5.8. A subject object pair (s, o) is said to satisfy an atomic predicate p i if and only if the values stored in the attributes
Set of usage configurations reachable from U Ξinit in 0 or 1 step 
=) defined in p i over the attributes of (s,o) and it is written as (s, o) |= p i .
A usage configuration can have multiple subject object pairs. The safety decision procedure searches for a usage configuration in which a subject can get the unsafe right over an object. Therefore, we extend the definition 5.8 to usage configurations as follows. Usage control commands are guarded with the conjunction of multiple atomic predicates and a usage configuration can also satisfy multiple atomic predicates. All possible subconjuncts of P α1 ∧ P β1 , P α2 ∧ P β2 . . . P αcn ∧ P βcn are in the set P ω . Therefore, we extend the definition 5.9 to conjuncts of atomic predicates in P ω . 
Definition 5.11. A predicate conjunct
If a usage configuration U Ξx satisfies the predicate conjunct P αi ∧ P βi in a usage control command U C i then the command is enabled in U Ξx and a subject in U Ξx can execute the command. The execution of a command may create a new object and store values into the attributes of the existing object, as a result, the current usage configuration will change. We formalize the notion of successful execution of usage control command and the corresponding change in usage configuration using the following definition. 
instance uc i (s, o) occurred in U Ξx and the U Ξx ′ is the new usage configuration after the occurrence of uc i (s, o).
If the execution of the usage control command is not successful then there will be not any change in the current usage configuration and it will not be called as an instance of the command.
Example 5.14. In the example 4.10, the occurrence of usage control command instance uc 4 
If multiple usage control commands are enabled then any one of the enabled command can be executed in the current usage configuration. Likewise, if multiple subject object pairs satisfy the predicate conjunct P αi ∧ P βi in the usage control command U C i , then any one of the pair can execute the usage control command U C i .
We use the symbol uc i to refer to a usage control command instance when the names of the particular subject and the object are not important in the context of discussion. Likewise, we useuc to denote an instance of a usage control command without naming the particular objects and without naming the particular usage control command.
The usage control command instances change the usage configurations and new configurations may satisfy additional atomic predicates and eventually reach a configuration where new usage control commands are enabled. For example, the faculty member can submit the final grade for a student after evaluating all his assignments and exams. In this example, each time the faculty member evaluates an assignment, the usage configuration will change and eventually when he completes the evaluation of all assignments and exams, the resulting usage control configuration will enable the submit command. To analyze the cumulative effect of such incremental changes we need to define the notion of reachable configurations. 
In a usage configuration, a subject may have options to execute more than one usage control command. For example, a student can take either a music course or a management course as an elective and depending on the elective he takes, he may have different sets of additional rights over different objects. Though both the choices together are not realizable, nevertheless both of them are individually reachable from the initial configuration. Therefore, the safety decision procedure needs to explore all such non-deterministic choices left with each individual subjects. This non-determinism adds another level of complexity to the safety analysis as it provides more than one possible future usage configurations for one usage configuration. To simplify the analysis, we extend the definition 5.11 to a set of usage configurations as follows. 
Definition 5.17. A predicate conjunct
P i ∈ P ω , P i = (p i1 ∧ p i2 ∧...̸ = ϕ ∧ o.ball id ̸ = ϕ) and P 3 : (s.player id ̸ = ϕ ∧ o.ball id ̸ = ϕ ∧ o.red . = s.
player id ). Let the two sets of usage configurations from example 5.16 be
With help of definition 5.17, we can track the changes in the satisfiability of set of predicate conjuncts in P ω in a set of reachable configurations. We formally define the set of reachable configurations in k or less steps as follows. = {s 1 , s 2 , o 1 , o 2 , s 3 .player id = P X356, s 3 .ball id =  ϕ, s 3 .creator id = ϕ, s 3 .red = ϕ}.
We define the function f Ξω to track the changes in the satisfiable predicate conjuncts in P ω . We pictorially summarize the notions defined so far in the Figure 1 . The upward arrows denote the requests from the subjects to execute the usage control commands. The downward arrows denote the successful execution of usage control commands, also called as the command instances. The set of configurations reachable from U Ξinit in unbounded number of steps is symbolically denoted by U Ξinit↑ * . In general U Ξinit↑ * is countably infinite, since the number of objects that can be created is unbounded. 
Definition 5.21. The predicate function f
This brings us to the central result of this paper. 
Since f Ξω ( U Ξinit↑k ) = f Ξω ( U Ξinit↑k+1 ), the above contradiction can occur only if there is some U Ξp ∈ U Ξinit↑k+2 and ∀q, U Ξq ∈ U Ξinit↑k+1 , f Ξω (U Ξq ) ̸ = f Ξω (U Ξp ). Such a U Ξp must be the result of executing some command uc t (s x , o y ), for some s x , o y , enabled in a U Ξr ∈ U Ξinit↑k+1 and not enabled by any configuration in U Ξinit↑k . We prove that our usage control authorization scheme does not have any such commands.
Case a: Let us suppose that uc t (s x , o y ) is a non-creating command guarded with the α−predicate conjunct P αt and the β−predicate conjunct P βt . If the predicate conjunct P αt ∧ P βt is satisfied for an s x , o y in U Ξr ∈ U Ξinit↑k+1 then there must exist some s
that satisfies the same predicate conjunct P αt ∧ P βt . Therefore, if the non-creating command uc t is enabled in U Ξinit↑k+1 then it must be enabled in U Ξinit↑k as well. Further, the execution of uc t in U Ξr ′ must produce a configuration
Case b: Let us suppose that uc t (s x , o y ) is a creating command guarded with the α−predicate conjunct P αt and the β−predicate conjunct P βt . If the predicate conjunct P αt ∧ P βt is satisfied for some s x in U Ξr ∈ U Ξinit↑k+1 then there must exist some s ′ x in some U Ξr ′ ∈ U Ξinit↑k that satisfies the same predicate conjunct P αt ∧ P βt . Therefore, if the creating command uc t is enabled in U Ξinit↑k+1 then it must be enabled in U Ξinit↑k as well. Further, the execution of uc t in U Ξr ′ must produce a configuration
Therefore, the assumption U Ξinit↑k+2 ̸ ≈ ω U Ξinit↑k+1 cannot be true, by contradiction. This argument can be applied inductively for n > k + 2. Note that, if the attribute update operations are allowed to use arithmetic operations like add and subtract then this argument would not be valid.
Proof: There are at most ω max predicate conjuncts that can be added to f Ξω ( U Ξinit↑ * ) from a given f Ξω ( U Ξinit↑0 ). The longest chain of such additions is at most ω max (which would happen if only one new predicate conjunct is added at each step). Thus it is not possible to have a conjunct P q ∈ f Ξω ( U Ξinit↑ω max +1 ) and P q ̸ ∈ f Ξω ( U Ξinit↑ω max ).
Theorem 5.28. The set U Ξinit↑ω max is computable and can be used to answer any safety question Υ (r) .
Proof: By definition Υ (r) can be true if and only if there is some P αi ∧ P βi in f Ξω ( U Ξinit↑ * ) which is the pre-condition of a creating or non-creating command that grants r.
Procedure Q ω given below computes U Ξinit↑ω max from which f Ξω ( U Ξinit↑ω max ) can be trivially computed. Let U Ξinit↑=k denote the set of configurations that can be reached from U Ξinit by using exactly k usage control commands. This is similar to definition 5.19 except for requiring exactly k commands rather than k or less.
Procedure Q ω :
For each U Ξp ∈ U Ξinit↑=k−1 do begin Add all U Ξq reachable from U Ξp in one command to U Ξinit↑=k without any duplicates; end for; U Ξinit↑k = U Ξinit↑k−1 ∪ U Ξinit↑=k ; k = k + 1; end while; By the argument given in the proof of lemma 5.2 in [4] , each iteration of the for loop above is computable, and thereby Procedure Q ω computes U Ξinit↑ω max . Computation of ω−equivalent usage configurations in context of example 4.8 is given in Appendix E.
ILLUSTRATION OF EXPRESSIVENESS
We illustrate the expressiveness of PreUCON id A using authorization policies applicable for MOOC (Massive Online Open Course) type learning portals that support unbounded number of subjects and objects. Though the attributes of the objects are exclusively meant to store object identifiers, this model can express interesting policies such as consumable rights, regenerative rights, separation of duty constraints, and data provenance over potentially infinite number of objects. To the best of our knowledge the safety decidable models in the prior literature do not support these policy features. 
Application of PreUCON
(s.id ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (s.id ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (o.id ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (s.student id . = s.id) ∧ (s.course id . = o.course id ) ∧ (s.course id ̸ = ϕ) (s.id . = o.(s.student id ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (s.student id ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (o.f aculty id ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (o.f aculty id ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (s.advisor ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (s.advisor ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (s.nadvisor 1 = ϕ) (s.nadvisor 1 ̸ = ϕ)∧ ((s.id ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (o.id ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (s.id ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (o.id ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (s.course id . = o.course id ) (s.course id . = o.course id ) ∧ (o.exam id ̸ = ϕ) ∧ ∧(o.exam id ̸ = ϕ) ∧ (s.id . = s.f aculty id ) ∧ (s.id = s.f aculty id ) ∧ (o.examiner 1 = ϕ) ∧ (o.examiner 1 ̸ . = s.id) ∧ (o.examiner 2 = ϕ) (o.
Decentralized Administration and Automation
Safety decidable PreUCON A models are amicable for decentralized administration and automation of security administration. In practice, security administration of large information systems are often managed with delegation of administrative responsibilities to multiple admins in a decentralized manner. The PreUCON id A model supports administrators to add new administrators to share their duties as well as to delegate some of their duties to the existing administrators. In the learning portal example given in the section 6.1, policies like inducting new faculty members and teaching assistants illustrate the decentralized administration within the learning portal. When the administrative rights are delegated to multiple administrators, it is important to ensure that the organization's central policies are not violated. In the the learning portal example, a student can become TA and a faculty member can also enroll in a course and become a student. However, the portal should not allow the students to evaluate their own answer sheets. Manually checking such policy violations is a difficult task. In the PreUCON id A model, we can express such violations as unsafe usage right and apply the safety decision procedure to automatically check if any of the reachable usage configuration can permit such an unsafe usage right.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Besides the features mentioned in Section 6, the PreUCON id A model also has its own limitations. For example, it cannot express policies like (i) a faculty member can claim incentives based on the number of exam copies he evaluates in a semester, and (ii) top 10% of students in the course are permitted to become student ambassadors for the high schools. Expression of these policies requires explicit arithmetic operations in the update functions which are lacking in PreUCON id A . Further, the attributes of the objects also need to be extended beyond the domain of object identifiers such as integer domains.
The inclusion of integer valued attributes in the object schema of PreUCON id A and integer-valued functions in the pre-update part of the usage control commands would help in expressing usage control policies beyond PreUCON id A . However, determining the safety decidability status of such an integrated model is a difficult problem. One part of the difficulty essentially comes from identifying a safety decidable fragment of PreUCON A with integer valued functions in the pre-update part of the usage control commands. Another part of the difficulty comes from checking effect of combining the identifier attributes and the integer domain attributes in a usage control authorization scheme. We discuss both these issues separately below.
First, we discuss the issues in the safety analysis of PreUCON Integer A with integer attributes without identifier attributes. In this model, the integer domain attributes of the objects can take potentially unbounded number of different values as the subjects can execute the usage control commands an unbounded number of times and each such execution can change the values stored in the attributes of the objects. In such models, the authorization predicates may become true after unbounded number of changes in the objects' attribute values. Whereas in the PreUCON id A model, the pre-update part of the usage control commands allows only copying object identifiers from one attribute to another attribute. Further, arithmetic operations over the object identifiers are not allowed, therefore, safety analysis can be performed by tracking changes in the satisfiability of set of all the atomic predicates, in the usage control commands, which checks equality between stored values in the attributes of the objects in each of the new configurations. This approach will not work for PreUCON Integer A since the attribute values are updated with arithmetic functions.
We conjecture that PreUCON
Integer A without object creation itself can simulate the two-counter machine [35] and finding a safety decidable fragment of the PreUCON Integer without identifier attributes itself is a non-trivial problem.
Second part of the problem is to check the effect of combining two safety decidable models which we explore in detail in the following section. Usage rights remain the same as in U ω . The changes in the remaining components of the scheme are as follows. In this command s is an input parameter and o is an output parameter. P α and P β are the α-predicate conjunct and the β-predicate conjunct, respectively, defined over the identifier domains attributes of the subject s and the o.id attribute. P γ is a conjunction of Boolean functions defined over the finite domain attributes of s.
Safety in PreUCON
The create operation carries the usual meaning. The update functions whose names start with f a are identifier domain functions which return a value from the identifier attributes of s or return o.id. Likewise, the functions whose names start with f b are finite domain functions which take finite domain attributes of s as input and return a value from the appropriate finite domain. Due to space limitations the structure of the non-creating commands is given in Appendix F.
PreUCON id+f inite A
can express relationships between infinite number of objects and unconstrained policies over finite security attributes. Though Similar to other proofs of undecidability of safety [2] , [5] , [13] , we reduce the halting problem to the safety problem in PreUCON id+f inite A . Our proof of undecidability of safety uses just one finite domain attribute. The proof details are given in Appendix G.
Future Work
The above result shows that simply combining two decidable safety models can lead to undecidable safety. A viable strategy might be to consider constraints on finite attributes that are combined with the safety decidable PreUCON id A model developed in this paper. For example, DRM applications can require users to pay/repay certain amount for a certain number of usage of resources [1] . Such policies can be expressed with a counting functions with reset features.
The safety decidable PreUCON id
A with identifier attribute domains is restrictive. The model does not support feature like multiple updates on attributes, set-valued attributes and array-valued attributes. Safety analysis of a sub-model with the above mentioned feature may require a data flow analysis on different attributes of infinite number of objects and it is a non-trivial work. It would be interesting to find if safety in the sub-models of PreUCON A with above mentioned features are decidable.
Safety analysis of the on-going authorization model is also an important problem; they are applicable in protecting resources in reactive systems like web services. Besides the attribute domain and update functions the on-going authorization model has an additional layer of difficulty due to interleaved and nonterminating executions of usage control commands. Extending the decidability result to similar submodels in OnU CON A is also non-trivial work. Lemma 5.2 in [4] would not hold as the usage control commands in the on-going authorization models may create unbounded number of new objects while executing one usage right. Note that an execution of usage control command may not terminate in OnU CON A unless the on-going authorization predicates become false or until the subject explicitly terminates the execution. Therefore, we may need to develop a different proof strategy for such models.
There are many avenues for future work in safety analysis of various sub-models in usage control besides pre-authorization model. Undecidability proofs, along with other results, in theorems A.5 and A.6 may help as demarcating tools in developing various safety decidable submodels of U CON ABC in future.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented a safety decidability result for PreUCON id A model with object identifier attributes. The safety decidable model can support interesting policies that are useful in today's information systems with unbounded resources. We conjuncture that (i) adding array attributes with constant size, integer attributes, and type attributes into the object schema would not affect the safety decidability of the model, and (ii) adding unrestricted arithmetic update operations on integer attributes would make the models safety undecidable. Further, studying safety decidability of the UCON with obligations, conditions, combination of finite and infinite attributes are interesting problems to explore. However, detailed analysis on such extensions are outside the scope of this article.
